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TAXING MUTUAL FUND SHARES
statutorily exempt category, the Court may well have provided an
efficient and fool-proof method of preserving individual rights on
the one hand and preserving the Selective Service System as a viable
administrative agency on the other.
J.M.A.
INTERNAL REVENUE - GIFT TAXATION - VALUATION
OF MUTUAL FUND SHARES
Howell v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
Shares in open-end investment companies,' popularly called
mutual funds, have long been listed in the daily security quotations
at two distinct prices - the bid price and the asked price.2 Yet for
years there has been much controversy concerning the proper method
of employing these representative figures in order to arrive at a per
share valuation which would satisfy the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. Prior to 1963, the Treasury regulations for gift taxation
did not specify which of the mutual fund prices, if either, was to be
used as the value upon which the gift tax would be assessed. Con-
sequently, the taxpayer often used either the lower bid price or the
mean between the bid and asked prices, the latter method being con-
sistent with the method used to value other securities.3 However,
in 1963, the Treasury Department promulgated gift tax regulation
1 Open-end investment companies are defined and regulated by the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Investment
Act).
2 The net asset value of a mutual fund share, usually called the bid price or public
redemption value, is computed twice daily by subtracting the liabilities of the fund
from the market value of all investments owned by the fund and pro rating that value
over the number of outstanding shares.
The asked price or public offering price is computed by adding to the bid price per
share an additional charge known as the load or load charge which represents the is-
suing expenses and accordingly varies from approximately 2 percent to 8 percent de-
pending upon the number of shares purchased at one time. See Investment Act, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(34) (1964).
It should be noted that the load charge is paid entirely to the underwriters, dealers,
and brokers who distribute and sell mutual fund shares and does not revert to the fund
or its management
3 The regulations for the valuation of most types of securities provide that the fair
market value per share or bond is the mean between the highest and lowest selling
prices on the valuation date. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2(c) (1958). It is this fair market
value that constitutes the basis upon which the gift (or estate) tax shall be imposed.
For the estate tax regulation, see Treas. Reg. 20.2031-2(c) (1958).
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25.2512-6(b), which provides that shares of mutual funds shall be
valued at the higher public offering price (the asked price) at the
date of the gift."
The silent, but growing, disenchantment with this standard was
recently manifested in -the case of Howell v. United States,5 where-
in the taxpayer directly challenged the validity of the regulation.
This attack brought under judicial scrutiny, for one of the very few
times in many years, all the problems which are inherent in the valu-
ing of mutual fund shares. Ultimately, the court's opinion serves to
emphasize the necessity for the Treasury Department to offer a more
lucid explanation of the relevant considerations which underlie any
newly published regulation.
In Howell, the taxpayer made an inter vivos gift of 45,085 open-
end investment company shares which she valued at the public re-
demption price in calculating the amount of gift tax due on the
transfer. Once she had paid the tax, the Commissioner, relying on
Treasury regulation 25.2512-6(b), determined that the shares
should have been valued at the public offering price, and assessed
the deficiency. In her claim for a refund, after paying the defi-
ciency, the taxpayer attacked the validity of the regulation with four
major arguments: (1) The net asset value, the public redemption
price, is realistically determined by the stock market; but the public
offering price is set by the issuer and is artificial. (2) The value
of stocks and bonds sold on the national exchanges has been set at
the mean between the highest and lowest selling prices on the date
of the gift. That value does not include brokers' commissions; but
the public offering price value of the regulation does include such
commissions, as reflected in the load charge which is added to the
public redemption price. To distinguish between mutual funds and
4 Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6(b) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6680, 1963-2 CUm. BULL.
417, provides that "[t)he fair market value of a share in an open-end investment com-
pany... is the public offering price of a share, adjusted for any reduction in price avail-
able to the public in acquiring the number of shares being valued."
In Revenue Procedure 64-18, 1964-1 CUM. BULL. 681, the Commissioner indicated
that for gifts and deaths prior to October 11, 1963, he would accept valuations of shares
in mutual funds by the following methods: (1) redemption value, or (2) the mean be-
tween the redemption price and the public offering price. Significantly, in the same
ruling, the Commissioner also indicated that the value used for estate or gift tax purposes
- and arrived at by one of the aforementioned methods - would also be controlling
for income tax purposes. For example, if an estate had paid tax on a value ascertained
by taking the mean between the bid and asked prices, the beneficiary would have to ac-
cept that value as his income tax basis. He could not subsequently declare his capital
gains basis to be the higher public offering price. In effect, the Commissioner was pre-
venting the taxpayers from using a change in the law to work a tax break.
5 290 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
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stocks and bonds in this manner is, therefore, arbitrary. (3) The
public offering price valuation discriminates unfairly against the tax-
payer who makes a taxable gift of a relatively small number of
mutual fund shares, since that load charge varies according to vol-
ume. (4) The regulation under attack fails to take into account
the well-established rule that the taxable value of a gift, subject to a
liability (herein the sales or load charge), may not exceed the fair
market value of the gift less the fair market value of the liability.'
Although the court admitted that these arguments were strong
and imaginative, it felt compelled to uphold the regulation's method
of valuation as reasonable. In order to arrive at this determination,
however, the court found it necessary to draw upon a well-worn
rationale: even though other reasonable methods of valuation may
exist, the method prescribed in the regulation will not be struck
down so long as it too, may be deemed reasonable.
To fully appreciate the import of the taxpayer's reference to the
principles governing stock traded on the national exchange, it is
necessary to examine the characteristics of an open-end investment
company. As defined by statute, an open-end investment company
is a company which offers for sale or has outstanding any redeem-
6 Id. at 692. For a discussion of this latter rule in a more general context, see Com-
missioner v. Proctor, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944); Jackman v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A.
704 (1941). The taxpayer in Howell, via this fourth argument, was requesting the
court to treat the sales charge as within that category of liabilities which pass with - and
thus detract in value from - the asset being transferred. See notes 27 & 28 infra &
accompanying text.
7 Id. at 693, citing Mearkle's Estate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 386, 388 (3d Cir.
1942). In a similar case Estate of Wells, 50 T.C. No. 88 (Sept. 16, 1968), the Tax
Court upheld the reasonableness of Treasury regulation 20.2031-8(b), (1958), as
amended, T.D. 6680, 1963-2 CM BULL. 417, which provides for the valuation of
open-end investment company shares for estate tax purposes by the same method as does
gift tax regulation 25.2512-6(b). See note 4 supra.
The executor-taxpayer in Wells valued the decedents mutual fund shares at the pub-
lic redemption price. The district director, proceeding under the regulations, valued
the shares at the higher public offering price and assessed a deficiency against the estate.
In support of his position, the taxpayer argued that no meaningful distinction existed
between a mutual fund share and any other security to warrant different methods of
valuation. However, the court was persuaded by the Commissioner's argument that the
only willing buyer-willing seller transactions which occurred were when the fund sold its
own shares at the public offering price, and that the public offering price was, therefore,
one reasonable alternative for the valuation of the shares. Citing Mearkle's Estate v.
Commissioner, supra, in support of its position, the court held that where the method
used is reasonable, that method must prevail despite the existence of other reasonable al-
ternative methods.
A strong dissent in Wells criticized the majority for adopting the Commissioner's
arguments. The dissenters maintained that since the public redemption price was all
that could ever be realized from the sale of a mutual fund share, that price should be the
strongest indicia of value.
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able security of which it is the issuer.8 Typically, a mutual fund
sells an unlimited number of shares in itself; the proceeds from
such sales are then invested in other securities under the guidance
of the management company which operates the fund. Shares in
the fund are continually sold and redeemed through one or more
of the following channels: (1) Salesmen employed by the manage-
ment company sell the fund's shares directly to the investor. (2) By
contract between the management company and an underwriter, who
subsequently distributes the shares through a number of dealers and
brokers. (3) By direct contracts between the management com-
pany and the dealers or brokers. Generally, each sale of a mutual
fund share includes a load charge which is paid to the underwriters,
brokers, and dealers in exchange for their services and thus, repre-
sents the costs of distribution. 10
Within the framework of the aforementioned channels of distri-
bution, most mutual fund share transactions may be characterized
as dealings between the fund and the investor. Few exchanges are
conducted between private investors, since brokers are often re-
stricted by their distributing contracts to non-private sales"- and
therefore may not serve as the agent or conduit which is normally
needed to consummate a private sale. In the absence of such con-
8 Investment Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5 (a) (1) (1964). The Investment Act classifies
this type investment company as a "management company." See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5 (a)
(1)(1964). This statutory classification of management company should not be con-
fused with the concept of a mutual fund manager, the independent company which man-
ages the investments of the fund. The latter is many times called a management com-
pany. Management company as used in this Article will refer to the mutual fund man-
ager. See note 9 infra.
Another source has defined the investment company as essentially a liquid aggrega-
tion of capital, consisting of public savings turned over for investment and productive
enterprise, which normally invests for yield as distinguished from control of productive
enterprise. Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1945), cert denied, 326
U.S. 795 (1946). For a discussion of the complex legal relationships which exist within
an open-end investment company, see Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A Structural Analysis,
47 VA. L. REv. 181 (1961); Lobell, Rights and Responsibilities in the Mutual Fund, 70
YALE L.J. 1258 (1961).
9 The managers are, in effect, the alter egos of the funds. Often the managers are
men who have decided to establish a mutual fund, then sell their services to the fund for
a fee - usually Y percent the value of the fund assets. The management provides a
variety of administrative services, ranging from portfolio advice to selection of sales per-
sonnel. For further discussion of this area, see Gopman, Current Problems in the
Regulation of Mutual Fund Selling Practices, 24 Bus. LAw. 409 (1969).
10 See note 2 supra. Some funds, commonly known as "no load" funds, sell and re-
deem their shares at the net asset value per share and assess no load charges. These
funds present no valuation problems under the regulation and are, therefore, beyond the
scope of this article.
11 Greene, The Uniform Offering Price of Mutual Fund Shares Under the Invest-
mzent Company Act of 1940, 37 U. DET. LJ.369 (1960); Comment, Valuation of Mu-
tual Funds for Federal Estate and Gift Tax Purposes, 42 NEB. L. REV. 848, 850 (1963).
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tractual constraints, however, private transactions are not prohibited
by the Investment Company Act of 1940.12 Still, within the re-
stricted market the fund remains the dominant seller and the re-
luctant redeemer. The individual investor is in a substantially
weaker position, since he can purchase shares only if he buys on the
fund's terms and at its established price, and can sell only if he
chooses to sell at the lower bid price by exercising his redemption
rights. 13  The absence of free negotiations over the terms of sale
makes this market almost unilateral.
The principal question that confronted the court in the instant
case was whether it should treat Mrs. Howell's shares like securities
sold on the national stock exchanges, or whether mutual fund shares
should be valued differently. In holding that the public offering
price was the proper measure of value, the court recognized the im-
portance of the dissimilar characteristics of the markets in which the
different securities are traded. Unfortunately, however, the court's
analysis did not probe these markets to feret out the crucial distinc-
tions which support the inclusion of distribution costs in the valua-
tion of mutual fund shares alone.
In responding to the taxpayer's first two arguments, the court
raised two interrelated and market-oriented considerations - the
concepts of fair market value and costs of distribution. First, the
court noted that the general method of valuation to be used under
both the estate and gift tax regulations must follow the Commis-
sioner's explication of fair market value: that ascertained from a
transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller, with neither
being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having full
knowledge of all relevant facts.14  This characterization, of course,
applies in the case of the larger national securities exchanges' 5 and
-
2 Investment Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(f) (1964).
13 It is interesting to note that the mutual funds come within a comprehensive regu-
latory scheme which covers most securities and provides controls on the right of redemp-
tion, the establishment of the public offering price, and the distribution practices. For
a listing of the relevant statutory guidelines, see Investment Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-22(a)-
(e) (1964). Generally, the Investment Company Act of 1940 grants to the National
Association of Securities Dealers the power to regulate the practices of its members in
accordance with statutory guidelines. For an excellent compilation of their enacted
rules, see CCH NASD DEALERS MANUAL (1967).
'ATreas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958). The gift tax regulations have adopted the
fair market value concept of the estate tax regulations. Treas. Reg. 25.2512-1 (1958).
Worthy of note is the fact that this rather theoretical definition approximates that of the
classical economist defining the purely competitive market. See J. DODD & T. HAIL-
STONES, EcONOMIcS: PIuNcIPLEs & APPLIcATIONS 150 (1961).
15 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (c)(a)(1) (1964).
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over-the-counter markets, where transactions are the result of un-
restricted negotiations between buyers and sellers.
But the characterization of the mutual fund market is different;
and thus the Treasury Department contrived a new definition of
fair market value - the public offering price16 - for estate and gift
taxation of mutual fund shares. The Howell court then, in apply-
ing the one reasonable alternative rationale, 7 justified the different
valuation methods by merely observing that in mutual fund transac-
tions there are no willing buyers and sellers. Since the fund sells
at its net asset value plus the load charge and redeems only if the
investor elects to exercise that right,18 there is absent in the mutual
fund market the value-determining phenomena of free negotiations
which prompted the fair market value standard of the Commissioner
for regular securities.
In a superficial way, the reasoning of the court was correct.
Without free negotiations, the general standard for fair market
value should not apply; and the different standard of public offer-
ing price is one reasonable alternative. In order to respond com-
pletely to the taxpayer's first argument, however, the court should
have answered the crucial question which it only raised and dis-
missed as unnecessary to decide:' 9 Is a mutual fund a mere agency
(or conduit) for its shareholders, or is it a separate and distinct
business entity? A brief analysis of mutual fund companies will
reveal the best answer to this question and will further disclose the
ultimate reasons for employing different standards of fair market
value.
The mutual fund exists as a separate business entity - a tradi-
tional commercial operation. Contrary to Mrs. Howell's assertions,
it cannot be deemed a mere conduit through which flow directly all
profits from investment in the regular securities market.20  If this
16See Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-8(b), 25.2512-6(b) (1958).
17 See note 7 supra & accompanying text
18290 F. Supp. at 694. See authorities cited in note 13 supra.
19 290 F. Supp. at 693. The court considered it unnecessary to answer the question
in the text because the method of valuation in the regulation under attack could be
deemed reasonable no matter how the mutual fund company was conceptualized. Id.
20 In a footnote, the court mentioned that in the Wells case the Tax Court rejected
the taxpayer's "conduit" argument and determined that the mutual fund has full owner-
ship in the investments while the shareholders merely own stock in the company. 290
F. Supp. at 693 n.15. The Howell court then went on to note that the Internal Revenue
Code treats mutual funds as conduits for income tax purposes, but that there is no such
treatment in the gift tax area. See INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954 §§ 851-55. This, said the
court, lent support to the government's position in the instant case. 290 F. Supp. at 693
n.15.
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were the case and the mutual fund were treated as an agent or
broker for mutual fund shareholders, then certainly the court would
have had to have considered the general securities market as relevant
for value determination and thus treated the net asset value of the
mutual fund shares as the true fair market value.21 But the fund
does more than siphon off profits or net asset value to its share-
holders. The fund is a business entity, which, through its selection
of a management company, has full control over the investments
which it makes and incurs all the normal liabilities of a commercial
operation. The mutual fund shareholders merely purchase stock in
the inventory - investments - of the fund. There is no willing
buyer-willing seller relationship because the company creates its own
market, with unique characteristics.
Implicit in the creation of the new investment market is the one
unique characteristic which the taxpayer attacked in both her first
and her second arguments - the load charge. Mrs. Howell argued
that the load charge should not be included in the valuation, or (in
the alternative) as included it was arbitrarily set. In order for the
court to respond properly to these first two arguments, therefore,
it should have discussed the market distinctions which necessitate
the imposition of that charge for valuation purposes.
As stated above, the first step in the court's discussion should
have been the determination that a mutual fund is a separate busi-
ness entity. The second step, upon which hinged the entire deci-
sion, should have been an analysis of the load charge itself. Again,
however, the court failed to respond to the taxpayer's allegation.
The court's second observation was merely that the inclusion of
distribution costs in the value of mutual fund shares, but not in the
value of other securities, should not be considered significant be-
cause many other items are marketed at a price which includes the
expense of distribution and sale.' Thus, the court attempted to
21 As discussed in note 2 supra, the net asset value of mutual fund shares is deter-
mined directly by reference to the market value of regular securities and other invest-
ments held by the investment company. If the market for regular securities were
considered the sole-determining market for mutual fund shares, then the public redemp-
tion price (net asset value without the load charge added on) would have to be treated
as the true fair market value and the distribution costs (load charge) would be viewed
as similar to the brokerage fees.
22 In both Wells and Howell, the courts analogized the mutual fund shares to sev-
eral types of assets, the most notable of which is the insurance policy. The Howell court
stated that the load charge is merely an expense of marketing, similar to the insurance
situation in which the replacement value cost is determined by including in the compu-
tation the commission paid to the insurance salesman. 290 F. Supp. at 694. The court
further noted that distribution costs are included in most retail prices. Id. So, too, are
excise taxes which have been held to be includible in the taxable value of rings. See
1969]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20: 917
justify the practice of taxing the load charge merely by pointing out
that, since other items are also taxed at values which include costs
of distribution, mutual fund shares need not be given the same treat-
ment as regular securities. A far better explanation and rationale
for the practice may be found in the differences between the mutual
fund market and that of other securities.
When a regular security is traded, the broker's commission is
an agent's fee for effecting the transaction between two private
individuals and it does not involve the company whose shares are
being traded. The initial cost of distribution of the regular security
is incorporated into its original issuing price; but once the share is
issued, all subsequent transactions are at a price which is unrelated
to asset value, but which reflects the demand by the investor for the
finite number of outstanding shares.
In comparison, the mutual fund share is continually issued at an
asked price which includes the net asset value and the load charge.
However, in nearly every case, the share will not be transferred be-
tween two private individuals. 3 Thus, brokers will not act as agents
for the investors at a private sale. Briefly stated, in the mutual fund
context, there is no equivalent to the broker's commission. In ef-
Publicker v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 250 (3d Cit. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 924
(1954) (excise tax on jewelry held to be a part of value for gift tax purposes); Duke v.
Commissioner, 200 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953); Estate of
Gould, 14 T.C. 414 (1950) (excise tax held to be an element of value for estate tax
purposes).
It is apparent that had the investor-donor or the investor-decedent not purchased the
mutual fund shares, an equivalent amount of cash would have remained in his estate or
would have been available for giving, and thus would have been taxed at its full dollar
value. The taxpayer in the instant case offered no reason why the mere transformation
of the cash asset into another less liquid form should markedly affect the taxable value,
that is the replacement cost, of the non-cash asset.
23 An occasional allusion is made to a developing third market for mutual funds
transactions between private individuals. The market described resembles the over-the-
counter market for regular securities and emerges when the managers of the mutual fund
cease to issue new shares because the fund has grown to a size which they consider to be
larger than that which they can effectively manage, when they determine that further
capital raised by the continued issuance of shares will not be as productive as they desire,
or when they determine that, by further expansion, the fund may run afoul of restrictive
statutory provisions. Although the fund does not issue new shares, it continues to re-
deem them and reserves the right to again issue shares in the future.
In this market, the shares have generally sold at a price above the public offering
price of the shares prior to the time that the fund stopped issuing shares. This phe-
nomenon seems to indicate that the asked price may fairly represent the market value of
a mutual fund share, the approach of the Treasury regulations under discussion. See
N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1967, at 73, col. 6. For a sample of the restrictive statutory provi-
sions, see Investment Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12; INT. REv. CODE o 1954, § 851 (b) (4);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (a fund holding directly or indirectly
more than 10 percent of any class of any equity security of an issuer registered under sec-
tion 12 of the Act is subject to insider trading restrictions under section 16).
TAXING MUTUAL FUND SHARES
fect, the sale of mutual fund shares is tantamount to the continual
new issuance of other types of securities, but with the mutual fund
such issuance never develops into the more advanced stages of sec-
ondary trading. Here is the real reason why the taxpayer in Howell
could not logically argue equivalency of the broker's commission and
the load charge - none, in fact, exists. The load charge is a
unique characteristic of a separate and distinct market, totally di-
vorced from the market which exhibits fees for the effectuation of
free negotiation, and such distribution costs must be included in the
valuation in order to reflect the liabilities incurred by the mutual
fund company prior to - and concomitant with - each new issu-
ance.
The remainder of the court's opinion was essentially irrelevant
to the actual holding. To the taxpayer's third argument, the court
replied simply that quantity discounts are an economic way of life. 4
They occur in the normal securities market and in the sale of most
retail goods, as well as in the mutual fund market. Not noted by
the court, but apposite to the argument, is the fact that gift taxes
only apply to gifts in excess of $3,000.5 Thus, the argument of dis-
crimination against the small investor still must legally fail, since
the true small investor-donor would not pay tax at all.2
Finally, the court rejected the argument that the load charge is
the type of liability contemplated by the rule which permits the de-
duction of the value of outstanding liabilities from the value of an
asset when determining the fair market value for gift tax purposes.2 7
As correctly noted by the court,28 a load charge is not the futuristic
type of liability which the rule contemplates. The charge is an ex-
pense which has already been paid; not a debt due which transfers
with the share. Indeed, at the time of the gift in the instant case,
24290 F. Supp. at 694.
25 The relevant gift tax provision states that the first $3,000 of gifts made to each
donee within one calendar year shall not, for valuation purposes, be included in the total
amount of taxable gifts for that year. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2503 (b).
26 This rebuttal also applies to the estate tax regulations, for those regulations spedfy
that the estate is to be taxed only on the extent of its value which exceeds $60,000, or
$120.000 if the marital deduction provisions apply. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§
2056, 2523. The exemption of $60,000 is provided for in Internal Revenue Code sec-
tion 2052.
27 290 F. Supp. at 694. Treasury regulation 25.2512-6(b) provides that in the valu-
ation of life insurance policies, the value of an outstanding policy loan would be deducted
from the value of the policy to determine the taxable value. For further discussion, see
TAX ASPECrS ON LIFE INSURANCE § 331 (1968) (Diamond Life Bulletins, Cincin-
nati, Ohio).
28290 F. Supp. at 694.
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the donor-taxpayer owned 100 percent of the equity in the property
transferred.
From the examination and comparison of the major character-
istics of the markets in which most securities are traded and that in
which mutual funds are traded, it becomes clear that there does exist
a valid underlying rationale for the difference in methods of valua-
tion imposed by the Treasury regulations. The Treasury must be
criticized, however, for fostering the ambiguity which hovers over
the regulations in this area. Instead of simply publishing a regula-
tion, the Treasury should outline the major technical and policy con-
siderations which militate toward the scheme adopted in the regula-
ation. Such a procedure would lend initial clarity to the reading of
the regulation, and thus aid the tax practitioner in his own interpre-
tation. Moreover, the courts would have a guidepost for later
interpretation of the policy and intent underlying the regulation
when it is subjected to attack or in need of being construed.
The Howell court may be commended only for its attempt to ra-
tionalize the regulations. As did the Tax Court in Estate of
Wells,29 the Howell court strived to analogize the mutual fund
share to assets, such as life insurance policies, which are similarly
treated by the regulations." Each court, however, delved primarily
into the analogous nature of the similar assets, not into the charac-
teristics of their markets which are crucial for determining value.
It is this latter standard, the trading market, which must be consid-
ered determinative in such cases.
In the past several years, mutual fund valuation procedures have
come under an increasing amount of legislative scrutiny."' Yet, lit-
tle effective action has resulted, and it now appears that the only
probable forum for a true challenging of the regulations is the
29 50 T.C. No. 88 (Sept 16, 1968). For the discussion of the Wells decision, see
note 7 supra.
3 0 See note 22 supra & accompanying text.
31 See Flomenhoft, Valuation of Mutual Fund Shares, 55 A.B.A.J. 182 (1969).
A proposed bill to change the regulations to value mutual funds at their public re-
demption price, H.R. 14,770, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), was introduced by Represen-
tative Pirnie on January 23, 1968. In support of his proposed legislation, Mr. Pirnie
noted a similar resolution enacted by the Section of Taxation, American Bar Associa-
tion, in July, 1966. 114 CONG. REC H253 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1968). See also 19
ABA TAXATION SECTION 72 (July, 1966); 20 ABA TAXATION SECrION 7 (April,
1967).
The general scheme proposed by the bar was to use public redemption value; how-
ever, Mr. Pirnie inserted a provision to value the shares at the redemption price or at
the value of the actual proceeds from the sale, whichever was the higher value. This
latter provision was to compensate for the developing third market in the select mutual
funds discussed earlier. See note 23 supra.
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courtroom. Nonetheless, it is submitted that, in light of the charac-
teristics of the trading market, the regulations as presently constita-
.ted are perfectly defendable and acceptable. Therefore, if the
Treasury would learn from this example and, in the future, more
clearly define the basis for its regulations, the time and expense of
Howell type litigation could thereby be mitigated.
R. E. B.
